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ABSTRACT With a steadily growing number of vehicles, our roads are getting more and more crowded.
As a consequence, traffic jams are becoming common. Vehicle platoon systems form a possible solution in
the short term. It consists of a number of vehicles automatically following a leader vehicle, in-line, one after
another at a short but safe distance. Ideally, all vehicles have to maintain the same speed, so as to have a
better usage of the road by minimizing the distance between two vehicles. In this paper we present a timed
automata model of a vehicle platoon system with the goal of finding a minimal but guaranteed safe distance
between two vehicles under variable speed. Contrary to other models based on cooperative adaptive cruise
control, we assume no (Internet) communication among different vehicles or road system. Instead of such
global perspective we rather take a local point of view: each vehicle relies on its own sensors to dynamically
calculate and maintain a safe distance with the preceding member of the platoon. We use the model checker
UPPAAL to verify that the system does not deadlock, and most importantly, that it is safe, avoiding crashes
at all time.
INDEX TERMS Model checking, vehicle safety, modeling of platoon systems, formal verification.
I. INTRODUCTION
The impact of the growing number of vehicles on the envi-
ronment and human safety makes the usage of automotive
and AI systems of paramount importance. Over the last few
years, several solutions have been proposed ranging from the
encouragement of the use of public and clean energy trans-
portation, shared car and the adoption of smart circulation
such as smart traffic lights and intelligent roads [1]. Most
of them have shown positive effects but have not solved the
congestion and traffic jam problems completely due to an
endless growing number of vehicles. There is an urgent need
for effective solutions in the short term. Autonomous-driving
technology is the most promising approach towards a more
safe, fluid and naturally friendly traffic. But this technology
is, however, not yet ready to be used immediately because
of, among other things, of safety problems. One of the most
interesting and ready to be used technology in this context is
given by platoon systems.
A platoon system is a group of autonomous vehicles driv-
ing on the same direction at almost the same speed (see Fig. 1
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving
it for publication was Shichao Liu.
FIGURE 1. Vehicle platoon system.
for a demonstration of a platoon system consisting of eight
cars from the PATH project).
Automation makes it possible for vehicles to travel
together very close yet safely. As a consequence, platoon sys-
tems make it possible for a higher roadway throughput and a
better traffic flow [2]. Furthermore, because less acceleration
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is needed, platoon systems reduce the consumption of fuel,
contributing to less pollution and increasing the safety and
comfort of the driver.
Speed and distance control of each vehicle is done through
a fully automated longitudinal control system, which main-
tains a safe distance with respect to the vehicle in front.
As every control system consists of a cycle of three phases:
Sensing, Planning and Acting. A sensor continually checks
the space and speed of the vehicle and passes these data
to the control unit. The control unit processes the data and
plans an action that is fed to either the brake or throttle
actuators. Themain challenge is to avoid collision, a goal that,
however, cannot be fully guaranteed (e.g. a vehicle can hardly
be responsible for being hit from the back). It is therefore
reasonable to assume that platoon systems should have three
orders of magnitude less collisions than usual [3], meaning
that they should avoid collisions for which the vehicle is
responsible. Machine learning or data-driven algorithms for
the planning phase that guarantee such a level of safety would
need much more data than is available today. The alternative
that we explore in this paper is to formally verify safety of a
model of the control algorithm.
Besides the longitudinal control system, every vehicle in a
platoon system also has a lateral control system for following
the vehicle in front while maintaining constant distance from
the center of the lane. It uses sensors to determine the position
of the vehicle which feed the control unit, which in turn
decides on which actions need to be taken by the steering
actuators. The major challenge here is to guarantee that the
system work in case of low visibility.
The second problem we attack in this paper is scalability,
by proving platoon safety independently for each vehicle in
the platoon. Contrary to our model, existing formal models
of platoon systems assume that vehicles communicate with
each other and the leader through dedicated communica-
tion protocols [4] such as DSRC (Dedicated Short Range
Communications). But the limited communication range of
DSRC drastically limits the length of the platoon [5]. To solve
this problem [6] uses a decentralized platoon maintenance
algorithm, in which every vehicle only communicates with
its neighbor so that the limit of platoon length can be broken,
but safety guarantee of the longitudinal control algorithm has
not been formally verified.
Besides the above vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication,
few models concentrate on the vehicle to infrastructure (V2I)
communication, relying on road side communication unit
(RSU). Examples include [7]–[9] which discuss the design
of safe and efficient controllers for regulation of vehicles in
automated highways using game theoretic methods. While
promising, V2I communication requires high cost equipment
to mitigate communication deficiencies in platoon driving
scenarios: the limited connection time [10], unfairness in
service time [11] and high transmission error [12]. Our model
is simpler, does not rely on any external communication,
and is easily implementable through standard distance sensor
equipment.
The third problem we need to focus on is the longitu-
dinal control problem, which has an important implication
in current platoon maintenance research: either by relying
on wireless network communication or on prediction and
control methods. In [9] a multi-object control planning is
introduced, taking into account not only the leading vehicle,
but also shared situational knowledge between vehicles and
infrastructure, so that the system is able to track vehicles
directly ahead.
Most of the existing formal models for longitudinal control
units are based on the so-called string model, a mathematical
model suitable for studying stability problems. For exam-
ple, [13] investigates sufficient conditions for stability in
terms of bilinear matrix inequality, based on vehicles that use
wireless communication in a platoon. Also [14] studies sta-
bility of a longitudinal control system designed for vehicles
equipped with an adaptive cruise control. While stability is
shown to be possible at low velocity, verification of safety is
not studied.
A. OTHER MODELS OF PLATOON SYSTEMS
Despite the importance of safety, most of the current work on
longitudinal control units concentrates on optimization and
control methods. For example, [15] presents a cooperative
shared control driver assistance system which supports the
driver in the longitudinal vehicle control. Reference [16]
proposes a class of robust longitudinal control units for each
vehicle except the leading vehicle, based on an ideal swarm
model. The focus is on the collision avoidance problem, but
the model is not formally verified. Reference [17] presents a
distributed H-Infinity control method for multi-vehicle sys-
tems with identical dynamic controllers and rigid formation
geometry. Also this work pays attention only to robust and
string stability rather than safety property.
Besides optimization and control methods, [18] evaluates
longitudinal safety of platoon systems in dedicated lane on
highways. The analysis is based on simulation and it is inter-
esting because it shows that platoon systems significantly
improved the longitudinal safety when compared to the base
condition.
Similar to us, [19] proposes a virtual spacing policy to
replace the unknown spacing policies in platoon systems, but
without formal verification of safety properties. The latter is
exactly the goal of this paper.
B. OVERVIEW OF OUR CONTRIBUTION
For a clear description of our approach, we summarize our
threefold contribution.
I We introduce the requirements for formal longitudinal
control of automotive platoons. This allows us to better
understand the functioning of platooning mechanisms
and, more importantly, to verify essential properties
such as the functional correctness and safety of the
mechanisms. An important aspect of the mechanisms
is that we reserve space for vehicles to join or leave the
platoon, while ensuring safety.
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II We use a variable distance policy inside the longitu-
dinal control of platoon system, thus optimizing the
safe distance based on the speed of the vehicle. And
the longitudinal control unit algorithm we used for
the distance policy is not rely on classical prediction
algorithms, instead, it is based on a dynamical division
of the distance in front of the car into five zones.
III Compared with the existing research in longitudinal
control of platoon system, we mainly focus on the
key point of the whole system, the safety property.
In order to make a verification and avoid state explo-
sion, we look only locally one vehicle at the time,
meaning that the entire platoon is safe if all its members
inside the platoon follow the same control algorithm.
We use a timed-automata abstraction and verify the
system using the model checker UPPAAL. The model
checker UPPAAL can guarantee the verification of time
temporal properties for any possible execution of the
system unless it stops running. This verification has
been carried out under the assumptions that the vehicle
control is functioning well and all the vehicle parame-
ters we used, such as the length and type of the vehicles
are correct. And it is worth noting that we make the
verification based on an abstraction of the real system,
as the real system is hard to be verified. Through it is
important to continuously improve the precision of the
abstraction.
C. PLAN OF THE PAPER
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we introduce platoon systems, time automata,
and the model checker UPPAAL. In Section 3 we describe
the model of the longitudinal control systems in UPPAAL,
that we subject to verification in Section 4. We conclude in
Section 5, with some remarks and future direction.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce platoon systems and why
it is important to verify their longitudinal control unit. To this
end, we use the abstract model of timed automata and the
model checking tool UPPAAL based on time automata. Both
are briefly we introduced here.
A. PLATOON SYSTEMS
A platoon system is a driving pattern for a line of vehicles
driving on the same direction and almost at the same speed
one after another.
As shown in Fig. 2, three main scenarios play a role in
a platoon system on a highway: maintenance, joining and
splitting [20]. In the first scenario the goal of each vehicle
is to follow the preceding one maintaining a small but safe
distance, except for the first vehicle that drives safely to a
certain goal.
Platoon splitting happens when one vehicle leaves the
platoon, for example it reaches its own destination. In this
FIGURE 2. Scenarios in the platoon system.
case either the preceding car catches up with the new vehicle
in front or it becomes the leader of a new platoon.
Platoon joining consists of the reverse problem: a non-
member vehicle wants to join a platoon. In this case space
must be created in the platoon and when it is safe the new
vehicle merges with the platoon should be decided.
In this paper, we mainly focus on the platoon maintenance
problem. The other two scenarios can be easily added to
our model as parts of the future work. Other scenarios, like
lane merging and platoon in an urban environment are more
complicated and will not be treated here.
In the context of a platoon maintenance problem, there are
several aspects that need to be considered:
Vehicle type: The type of vehicles in a platoon has
clear effects on the parameters of a platoon system. For
instance, one needs to consider the length of the vehi-
cle l, as it is not feasible to consider an uniform length for
all vehicles in a platoon (trucks have a significant greater
length than cars). Also the maximum acceleration A
and maximum speed Vmax of each vehicle needs to be
considered. Further, in order to automatically maintain
a safe distance all vehicles in a platoon are assumed to
have some sensors continuously measuring the distance
with the preceding vehicle. Thus other parameters need
to be considered, such as the sensitivity (number of mea-
surement per time unit) of the sensor, that, again, can be
different for each vehicle. In order to reduce the number
of parameters involved, we will take a local view of the
system, considering length, acceleration, max velocity
and sensitivity of the sensor in a single vehicle.
Spacing policy: Currently, platoon systems either use
a constant distance policy [21], [22], [23] or a variable
distance policy [24], [25]. The former onemeans that the
distance between two vehicles inside the platoon must
remain the same (up to some minor parameters) despite
the change of the vehicle speed. Dynamic spacing policy
instead postulates the possibility of changing the dis-
tance between two cars depending on a fixed control
strategy. In this paper, we use a variable distance policy,
thus optimizing the safe distance based on the speed of
the vehicle.
Communication method: Vehicles in platoon systems
are often assumed to communicate with each other.
There are two different types of communication. One is
between two vehicles and another is between vehicles
and infrastructure. While these are promising lines of
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research, currently it is not possible to assume direct
communication among all vehicles in a platoon because
of the instability of wifi connectivity, or because of
the high cost in the infrastructure. As a consequence
we assume no communication inside and outside the
platoon take place, but assume cheaper sensor in each
vehicle to continuously measure the distance with the
vehicle in front.
Control strategy: The control strategy defines the con-
trol algorithms on the vehicle inside the platoon. The
verification of such algorithm is the main focus of this
paper. We will discuss it in part III.
B. TIMED AUTOMATA IN UPPAAL
Timed automata [26], [27] is a finite state model for the
verification of real time systems. It is based on an extension of
Büchi automata with time clock and delays. Timed automata
has been simplified into timed safety automata (TSA) [28]
by combining time constraints with the action constraints
in the transitions and by specifying progress properties as
invariant conditions local to a state. Based on TSA, sev-
eral model checking tools have been developed, including
UPPAAL [29].
We use timed automata to discretize the sensing domain
using worst case values instead of continuous actions. The
advantage is a better use of resource and a shorter computa-
tional time for the verification at the cost of an approximation
of the real environment. For the verification of safety of
the longitudinal control systems we use the model checker
UPPAAL, a tool for modeling, validation and verification of
real-time systems [29]. In general, UPPAAL is appropriate
for systems that can be modeled as a collection of uncertainty
processes with finite control structure and real-valued clocks
such as timed safety automata. Different automata commu-
nicate through channels and shared data structures. Typical
application areas include real-time controllers, communica-
tion protocols, and other safety critical systems.
In UPPAAL, a system is modeled as a network of timed
automata which act in parallel on a set of global and local
discrete variables. The state of a system is defined by the
locations of the each automata, the values of the discrete
variable, and the time value of each clock.
We give the basic definitions of the syntax and semantics
of timed automata, here use the following notations:
Let T be a set of clocks and C(T ) a set of conjunctive
convex constrains clocks, such as m ≤ t or m−n ≤ t
where m and n are clocks and t is a natural number repre-
senting discrete time. A timed automaton is a finite directed
graph with conditions and resets of valued clocks, i.e. a tuple
(L, l0,E,A, I ) where
• L is a finite set of locations,
• l0 ∈ L denotes the initial location,
• A is a set of actions, including co-actions for communi-
cation and and internal-action for manipulating discrete
variables,
• E ⊆ L×A×C(T )×2C×L are the edges between loca-
tions which are labelled with an action, a time constraint,
and a set of clocks to be reset, and
• I : L → C(T ) is a function mapping invariant con-
straints to locations.
The basic idea is that while time passes, an automaton can
stay in a certain state until the invariant property holds. If the
time constraint of an edge leaving from a location is true,
then without any passing of time its action is executed, and
all clock in the set labelling the edge are reset to 0. Finally,
the execution of an edge moves the automaton to the target
location of the edge itself.
As a consequence, timed automata is highly non determin-
istic, and even if their behaviour can be described by a finite
set of location, the system itself can have an infinite set of
different states.
Model checking is a technique for automatically verifying
formal properties of systems by exploring all its state. In the
case of timed automata, this is rather challenging because
exploring all states results in an infinite transition system.
UPPAAL uses an exact finite state abstraction based on con-
vex polyhedra as defined by clock constraints.
UPPAAL implements a symbolic exploration algorithm
based on the symbolic semantics of networks of timed
automata. In the case of reachability or liveness properties
UPPAAL computes successor states symbolically as follows:
when an edge is executed, the next state is delayed infinitely
(if possible) and the invariant of the state is applied. This
computes all the (timed) successor states w.r.t. a given step.
Thus computing successors in UPPAAL refer to trying all
possible actions followed by delay.
The properties that can be checked by UPPAAL, are
defined in a subset of Timed CTL (Computation Tree Logic).
We give here just few examples of temporal properties, where
r and s are basic state properties on clock and discrete
variables:
Possibly The property E♦r holds if there exists an exe-
cution with at least one state satisfying the property r .
Invariantly The property A r holds if every state in
every execution satisfies the property r .
Potentially always The property E r holds if every
state of some execution satisfies the property r .
Eventually The property A♦r holds if for every execu-
tion there is a state which satisfies r .
Leads to r  s holds in every execution for which
whenever r holds eventually s will holds too. It can also
be expressed as A(r ⇒ A♦s).
DeadlocksAn execution deadlockwhen after some state
there is no successful action that can be taken. This is
expressed in UPPAAL by E♦false.
III. MODELING OF PLATOON
The first car of a platoon system is the leading vehicle.
Except for the leading vehicle, all other vehicle members
of the platoon are controlled autonomously according to the
following functionalities:
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• longitudinal control, which takes care of speed and dis-
tance,
• Lateral control, which takes care of lane tracking, lane
changing and steering.
Other functionalities such as platoon formation and platoon
splitting are part of the maneuver coordinator. We focus only
on a fully automatic longitudinal control. It should fulfill
the following requirements (driving policies) based on three
‘‘common sense’’ rules:
• The vehicle should keep a safe distance from the vehicle
in front so to be able to stop in time in case of need;
• The vehicle should leave (other) vehicles the possibility
to cut-in, to enter or to exit the platoon;
• The vehicle should respect the driving rules (for instance
max speed).
A. KEEP A SAFE DISTANCE
Full safety for a vehicle, is unfeasible and even impossible.
For example there are 108 meters necessary to fully stop a
light vehicle driving at 130 km/hwith max brake deceleration
of 6.096 m/s2 at response time of 1/100 seconds. Also it
is impossible to avoid that other vehicles can always hit the
one we are considering from behind or laterally. We therefore
focus on just keeping a safe distance from the vehicle in front
assuming that it will not crash (stopping in almost zero time).
B. LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY
We focus on a set of local responsibility:
• No inter-vehicle communication: vehicles in a platoon
system have no communication with other vehicles or
leader;
• No high-way communication: vehicles in a platoon
systems have no communication with highway infras-
tructure;
• No constant speed and spacing: vehicles in a platoon sys-
tems have variable speed and spacing parameters so to
allow cut-in of a vehicle, i.e. joining, leaving, or passing
through a platoon.
C. RESPECT OF DRIVING RULES
In this context, the most important driving rule that needs to
be respected is to be within the speed limit. A consequence
is that leadership becomes dynamic. For example, after a cut-
in in a platoon driving at maximum speed, it is impossible
for the vehicle which allows the cut-in to catch up with the
vehicle in front. In this case the current vehicle became the
leader of a new platoon system.
We can assume that some parameters are fixed by some
regulations, while other may depend on each vehicle. Below
we show a table with the parameters we consider (rightmost
column) and their comparison with standard values for a car
driven by human (non-professional pilot):
The control unit of each vehicle in a platoon systems
gets input through a sensor measuring the distance with the
vehicle in front. On receiving this information the control
unit regulates the speed via instructing the throttle or the
TABLE 1. Comparison of parameters.
FIGURE 3. Model of the platoon.
brakes resulting in an accelerating or decelerating action.
Through this feedback control, the distance between each
vehicle always stays inside a safe range.
Let us consider a platoon system where V1 is the leader
vehicle and V2, . . .Vn and Vn+1, the follower vehicles,
as shown in Figure 3.
Definition 1 (Safe Longitudinal Distance): Let d denote
the actual current distances between the front of vehicle Vi+1
and the back of vehicle Vi, with 0 ≤ d ≤ dmax , and dmax
the maximum allowable distance between two vehicles inside
a platoon [3]. The distance d is safe if d > 0 for any rea-
sonable deceleration (bounded by the maximum usage of the
brakes Bmax) and response time ρ of Vi+1 with velocity less
than vmax .
This means that the vehicle Vi+1 will not collide with Vi
even in the worst scenario when Vi is braking at the maximum
level and Vi+1 is moving at the maximum speed. Note that the
definition of safe longitudinal distance relies on both local
parameters ρ, Bmax , and vmax , and the velocity vi (vi ≤ vmax)
of the front vehicle Vi as well.
The following lemma calculate the safe longitudinal dis-
tance.
Lemma 1: Let Vi+1 be the vehicle behind vehicle Vi in
the longitudinal direction, let the rest parameters be as in the
Definition 1. The minimal safe longitudinal distance between
the front of vehicle Vi+1 and the back of vehicle Vi is:
dmin =
[
vmaxρ + v
2
max
2Bmax
− v
2
i
2Bmax
]
+
.
Proof: Let d be the initial distance between Vi+1 and
Vi and assume the worst case scenario that Vi+1 is moving
at maximum velocity vmax . The velocity of the front vehicle
Vi decreases with a rate Bmax until arrives to zero (or else
it collides with something in front). While, vehicle Vi+1
keeps the velocity of vmax for ρ time units and then slows
down with the rate of Bmax (we assume all the vehicles
have the same maximum negative acceleration) until totally
stops (or otherwise a crash happens). The distance between
the two vehicles will be monotonically decreasing until both
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FIGURE 4. Divided distance of platoon system.
vehicles stop. A collision is avoided if the distance between
the two vehicles is always larger than zero. We thus have
d + v
2
i
2Bmax
−
(
vmaxρ + v
2
max
2Bmax
)
> 0
from which we get the minimum distance dmin < d , thus
concluding the proof.
The minimal distance dmin above is based on the max-
imal use of the brakes by the vehicle following another
one which is also using its brake maximally. For instance,
for two vehicles, one driven by a human with a reaction
time between 1 and 2 seconds, following another at a speed
of 130 km/h, the minimal safe longitudinal distance is
between 36 and 72 cm.
In reality however, the passengers of the vehicles in a
platoon want to have a comfortable experience, with a
minimal usage of the maximal brakes. For this reason,
in our longitudinal control algorithm we divide the distance
between two vehicles in a platoon into 5 zones d1 to d5 (see
Figure 4) that dictate the actions of the vehicle depending on
his continuously measured longitudinal distance d with the
front vehicle. We assume this distance d to be measured by
a sensor of Vi+1, and it needs not rely on classical prediction
algorithms.
• When 0 < d ≤ d1 the vehicle Vi+1 is in the Hard
_brake zone, meaning that brakes should be used as
hard as possible in order to avoid collision (i.e. d = 0)
with the front vehicle. In this situation the throttle is not
used, we assume that the vehicle decelerates at 6 m/s2,
the maximal negative acceleration acceptable (but not
necessarily comfortable) by humans, with the lateral
control system taking actions to avoid and correct lateral
deviations. Notice that d1 can be even smaller than the
minimal safe distance because the velocity of Vi+1 can
not be maximal in this zone, as it will be decelerating
in the previous zones. For instance, in this paper we set
d1 = 20 cm for a vehicle with speed 130 km/h, whereas
we have seen that in this case the minimal safe distance
is 36 cm.
• If d1 < d ≤ d2 then Vi+1 is in the Soft_brake
zone. In this case the control system sends to the actua-
tors the message to use the brakes in a comfortable man-
ner and to not use the throttle. In this paper, considering
UPPAAL can only accept integer value, we assume that
this means a negative acceleration of 4 m/s2, so that
driver and passenger can have a relatively comfortable
ride experience.
• When d2 < d ≤ d3 the vehicle Vi+1 is in the Close
distance zone. Inside this range Vi+1 stays at a
safe distance without the need to use the brakes but
only by releasing the throttle. We assume that under this
circumstance the vehicle decelerates at 1 m/s2 because
of the friction, so that the speedwill slow down smoothly
and the energy will be saved.
• If d3 < d ≤ d4 thenVi+1 is in theNormal distance
zone, using no brakes and remaining at a constant speed
(i.e. with acceleration of 0 m/s2).
• When d4 < d ≤ d5 the vehicle Vi+1 is in the Far
distance zone, which means it has to accelerate (if
allowed by the speed limit) to get closer to the platoon.
Clearly brakes are not needed. For simplicity and consid-
eringUPPAAL can only accept integer value, we assume
that Vi+1 accelerates at 6 m/s2, an acceleration consid-
ered acceptable by humans.
The goal of this paper is to identify d1 < d2 < d3 <
d4 < d5 such that no collision with the front car is guaranteed
(i.e. it is never the case that the actual distance d = 0).
We model a control strategy based on the above description
and verify its safety in UPPAAL as a parallel composition
of a processes describing the behaviour of each follower
vehicle in the platoon along with an extra process describ-
ing the behaviour of the sensor in front of each follower
vehicle.
In order to avoid state explosion, we look at only one local
vehicle at the time,meaning that the entire platoon is safe if all
its members inside the platoon follow the same control algo-
rithm. The local model is a parallel composition of two timed
automata, the control_system and the sensor . The UPPAAL
model of the control_system consists of seven states: one for
each zone where the vehicle current is, one representing a
car that is stopped, and another for a car becoming a leader
of the platoon. Each state has a transition looping to itself
representing the interaction with sensor through channel Dist
to receive the current distance. When the current distance
changes, transitions may happen.
In order to build a specific UPPAAL model, and because
UPPAAL can only accept integer values, we use the following
parameters:
• Braking has three values 0, 1 and 2, corresponding to no
brake (−1 m/s2), soft brake (−4 m/s2) and hard brake
(−6 m/s2);
• We represent the throttle as the integer value PosAcc
ranging between 0 and 6 (at 0 the vehicle decelerate
by friction, at 6 the velocity will reach and eventually
remain at the maximum speed). Each increase of PosAcc
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Algorithm 1 Platoon Model Declaration
1 begin
2 int B = 0;
3 chan Dist;
4 int x = 0;
5 const int l = 500;
6 const int d1 = 20;
7 int d2 = 210;
8 int d3 = 220;
9 int d4 = 220+ l;
10 int d5 = (220+ l) ∗ 2+ l;
11 int d = 220;
12 int V = 36;
13 const int Vmax = 36;
14 const int t = 1;
15 clock clk1;
16 int z;
17 end
represents a positive acceleration of 6 m/s2, until the
max speed is reaching;
• We use clk1 in the sensor model to indicate the global
time of the system, measured in Ticks (T ), the time
needed by the sensor to complete a cycle in sending the
distance information to the control system.We set this to
1/100 second, a speed easily satisfied by current sensor
technology.
Because UPPAL do not accept rational numbers, we use
centimeters as unit of distance rather than meters, as declared
in Algorithm 1.
B is the brake value, Dist is the communication channel
between the control system and the sensor, d is the distance
to the front vehicle. As this depends on the environment,
we increase or decrease d by a randomly, but reasonable,
generated value x. Finally we assume that all the vehicles
are at most 5 meters long, thus the length l is initialized to
500 centimeters. We have seen that d1 is set to 20 cm, but d2
and d3 will vary depending on the speed of the vehicle. After
running several experiments in UPPAAL to find reasonable
values for d2 and d3, we set them to 210 and 220 centimeters,
respectively. The distances d4 and d5 depend both on d3
and l, so as to allow enough space for non-members vehicles
to join the platoon system. The initial distance between a
rear vehicle and the preceding one is set to 220 centimeters,
which is the threshold between the close distance zone and
the normal distance zone. By using model checking these
values guarantee that a vehicle in the platoon does not collide
with the one in front under reasonable circumstances, for
instance, the front vehicle does not fully stop in zero time as
a consequence of a crash. Finally, according to the maximum
speed limit of the highway, we assume the Vmax and the initial
velocity to be 36 cm/T , in addition, the period of sensor is set
to t T (here t = 1).
Next we explain the states of the local vehicle model in
UPPAAL. Assume a vehicle Vi+1 stays in the Normald ist
state with the preceding vehicle Vi, and the interval distance
is d . When d < d3, the transition condition is fulfilled and
thus the control system jump to the state Closed ist assigning
PosAcc to 0, as shown in Fig. 5. If the distance reduces even
more, then the control systemwill go into theHardbrake state.
However in the case the front vehicle accelerates, the distance
will increase and eventually the control system will return
into the Normald ist state again. When the system is in the
state Hardbraked ist , it will increase braking, thus using the
brakes maximally. In this state, there are also two possibil-
ities. One possibility is to jump back to the previous state,
and another one is that after several rounds of decreasing
velocity by V := V −6 due to the hard brake value−6 m/s2,
the vehicle will fully stop, and the velocity will become 0
cm/T , thus the vehicle will enter state Car_stopped_dist .
If the distance remains d < d1, vehicle Vi+1 will keep inside
Car_stopped_dist state, until d becomes d >= d3, thus
the control system will jump back to Normal_dist with the
updates B := 0 and PosAcc := 1, then the vehicle will make
an acceleration with V := V + 3 until the velocity reach the
maximum value.
Above we have given a explanation to the state tran-
sition in the loop of distance reducing. Now we explain
the loop of distance increasing. When Vi makes a sudden
acceleration, the distance may fulfill the condition d > d4,
thus Vi+1 will accelerate through an update of PosAcc :=
PosAcc + 1, and correspondingly the control system will
enter Fard ist state. There are two loops on this state, where
PosAcc := PosAcc + 1 and V := V + 6 will be taken until
PosAcc arrives the value of 6. If the velocity of Vi+1 reaches
the maximum value and still can not catch up with Vi, after
matching condition d > d5, the control system will make a
transition to New_leader state, which means the distance is
too far for vehicle Vi+1 to remain inside the platoon system
and thus becomes a new platoon leader or a non-member
vehicle.
Next we explain the UPPAAL model of sensor . As shown
in Fig. 6, there are in total three states: Car_Moving,
Car_Stopped and Nothing_in_front . Every state has a self-
loop which includes synchronizing on the Dist channel.
When the sensor receives a request from the control system,
the synchronization will act as a feedback that sends the
distance information. And based on the distance message,
the state of control system will make a state transition or
remain in the original state. When the rear vehicle is moving
forward, in t T period of time the relative distance between
the rear vehicle and the preceding one can be increasing or
decreasing. Based on the following three formulas we express
this situation:
x : int[0,Vmax ∗ t]; z := x − V ∗ t; d := d + z;
when the rear vehicle totally stops, the velocity becomes zero,
so that the relative distance can only keep increasing or be the
same value. Thus based on the model, we use the next two
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FIGURE 5. Local vehicle model in UPPAAL.
formulas to calculate it:
x : int[0,Vmax ∗ t]; d := d + x;
In both situations x is a random value between 0 and
Vmax ∗ t to show the change of distance. If d > d5, the vehicle
has already left the platoon, thus the sensor will not receive
distance value request from control system, and correspond-
ingly it will not send back the distance information due to
save the energy. In this way, the rear vehicle will enter a
Nothing_in_front state, which automatically becomes a new
platoon leader.
IV. VEHICLE MODEL VERIFICATION OF PLATOON
SYSTEM USING UPPAAL
As we have timed automata for modelling the control sys-
tem and the sensor of a vehicle inside a platoon, we can
carry out verification of specific properties using UPPAAL.
As each vehicle among the followers has the same model,
the verification can deal with arbitrary length of platoon by
simply adding the number of followers. Here we just verify
two properties through the local control system model and
the sensor model. These two properties are the deadlock
freedom problem and the guarantee safety problem. The
former is to ensure the system never blocks and the latter
is to make sure the distance between two vehicles is always
strictly positive. Here using the ‘‘brute-force’’ approach [3]
TABLE 2. Definitions of time period and velocity.
that check all possible states, UPPAAL needs 3 to 5 minutes
for computing the result due to the high amount of data. For
the sake of simplicity, the particular parameter for verification
has been used. In particular, we set the time period to 1 T and
Vmax to 36 cm/T . If the control_system and sensor models
are correct, this property should be satisfied:
A  not deadlock;
We conduct the verification through the model checking
tool UPPAAL. All experiments are carried out on a machine
with Intel Core i7 3.40 GHz CPU and 7.7 GB memory under
Windows. In order to get accurate results and avoid fluctu-
ation, each model performs 10 runs with an average cutoff
time of 186.65 s. Finally, if the verification process finishes
successfully, then it means that the ‘‘no deadlock’’ property is
satisfied. The other practical property is to guarantee that the
distance between rear vehicle and preceding vehicle is always
strictly larger than zero. To express this property, we use the
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FIGURE 6. Local sensor model in UPPAAL.
TABLE 3. Definitions of distance allocation and velocity.
following formula, which uses the property of invariant in
UPPAAL:
A  d > 0;
Similar to the process of verifying the ‘‘no deadlock’’
property, we perform 10 runs for each model with a duration
time of 153.85 s. With the proof of this formula, the distance
between each two neighboring vehicles will be always larger
than zero, which means the crash will never happen inside the
platoon based on this model.
In this experiment, the velocity is set to 36 cm/T . Under
this experimental setup, we set a group of time periods of the
sensor which all satisfy the verified properties. In practice,
with the larger period of the sensor, the smaller amount of
energy will be required. As a result, we choose the largest
one among all values of time periods of the sensor. But here
comes a problem – when the velocity slows down, could the
time period be even larger under the safety requirement? In
order to investigate the result in more depth, we set a group
of velocities to indicate the decreasing trend of velocity and
conduct the model checking to evaluate whether they can
fulfill the safety requirements and find out the suitable time
period under each velocity. Under four independent experi-
ments similar to the initial model checking model, we get the
results below:
According to the results in Table 2, we know that the time
period will be increased with the decrement of the velocity,
which also complies with the facts. As velocity slows down,
the distance between two vehicles can be larger during one
period of time, so the requirements for the frequency of the
sensor will be reduced too. Based on the period and velocity
setups in Table 2, we conduct a verification of a full platoon
system with one leader and two followers, which proves and
guarantees that no deadlock and no crash will happen. In the
future we can design a variable frequency sensor based on
velocity, so, to a certain degree, the energy and consumption
can be saved and reduced.
The above table shows the relationship between the time
period and the variable velocity. In order to guarantee safety,
we adopt the distance allocation method under the maximum
allowed velocity of 36 m/s. Thus this group of distance
parameters meet the safety requirements of the platoon sys-
tem at all velocities. If we fix the time period of the sensors,
with the decrement of the velocity of the platoon, we can get
several groups of distance allocation through several rounds
of model checking, as shown in table 3 below.
From table 3 the time periods of sensors in control system
have been fixed to 1 T , and the d1 to d5 are based on
the longitudinal control unit algorithm, also mentioned in
Section III. As the velocity slows down, the allocation values
of safe longitudinal distance become smaller too. Thus when
the whole platoon moves forward in a rather low velocity,
the distances among any two neighboring vehicles inside the
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platoon can be smaller, which can bring a higher roadway
throughput.
V. CONCLUSION
Our goal of this formal model is to guarantee that no acci-
dent happens inside this platoon system in one hundred
percent. Contrary to traditional models based on cooper-
ative adaptive cruise control, we assume no communica-
tion among vehicles and the needed distance data can be
obtained from sensors. Hence, in our method, the sensors
are of great importance. While we can not make sure that
the sensor never makes a mistake – for instance safety mis-
takes may occur under the following two cases: safety-critic
miss and safety-critic ghost [3]. Safety-critic miss means a
dangerous situation sensed as non-dangerous circumstance
by the system which will lead to the neglect of danger and
further cause serious accidents. Safety-critic ghost means
non-dangerous situation sensed as a danger by the system
which will cause unnecessary braking and further affect the
comfort experience of the passengers inside the vehicle.
The solution is that we use several independent and dis-
tributed sensing systems which form a redundant mechanism.
In this way, the accuracy of sensing system will be greatly
improved.
In this paper, we give a time automata model to the vehicle
platoon system and verify its safety. Compared to the existing
research works, our main contribution is that we mainly focus
on the safety property of the longitudinal control problem
in platoon system, where we use UPPAAL as the model
checking tool. Different from simulation, we make a rigorous
proof of the safety property through the process of model
checking which all states have been traversed. As a result,
we prove that no crash and no deadlock happen.
In future work, we plan to study if the entire system is
stable in a safe state. In addition, if a crash of the leading
vehicle causes an abrupt and instantaneous stop, we would
like to study howmany following vehicles behind it will crash
due to wave effect. In addition, we would also like to find
the safest position in a platoon based on the control strategy
in this paper, in order to improve the ability of the vehicle
platoon control system.
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